"So-called Gender Freedoms": The Western Origins of Russian Transphobia

^{20 November 2023}

On June 13, 2023, Russia's federal parliament-or State Duma-held the first reading of a bill that would revoke the rights of transgender people to legally and medically transition. Duma Deputy Nikolai Nikolaev spoke of great concern for the safety of Russian children: "A criminal network… is currently anticipating our passing this law. 'Trans-friendly' psychologists are actively trying to rush underage and young people who are only just involved in the process of changing their genders to do so before [it] passes."[1] Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin was also concerned. He cited the improbable figure that 1.4% of adolescents had undergone "sex reassignment" surgery.[2] The remaining members of the Duma agreed that something must be done, with the bill passing its first, second and third readings unanimously. There was one catch: children already could not legally or medically undergo a gender transition in Russia. The Ministry of Health had already required that an applicant be at least 18 years of age to do so.[3] What were the origins of Nikolaev and Volodin's concerns for the safety of Russian children?

In the past decade, Russia has come increasingly into conflict with the West over LGBTQ+ issues.[4] The adoption of the 2013 "gay propaganda" law, the depiction of Europe as "Gayropa," and the refusal to address the persecution of gays and lesbians in the Russian republic of Chechnya, has led some scholars to describe the rise of a "Sexual Cold War" between Russia and the West.[5] Russian politicians have come to depict their country as a "norm entrepreneur" in moral conservativism, as an international protector of conservative values.[6] And yet, both Nikolaev and Volodin were drawing on Western conservative talking points in their concern for the threat of "gender ideology"; Nikolaev's comments on "trans-friendly" therapists pressuring Russian children were reflective of anti-gender debates currently raging in the United Kingdom.[7] Volodin's statistics were based on a misquoted UCLA study of American youth.[8] The irony is apparent: Russian traditional-values conservatives accuse opponents of foreign influence, while relying in the same way on "on [their] own set of transnational organizations."[9]

Through the case study of the recent legislation outlawing gender transition in Russia, this essay outlines the rise of traditional-values conservativism in Russia, arguing that the West[10] plays an important role both as both an exporter of homophobic ideology and also as a strawman for Russian conservative actors to portray as an aggressor and existential threat.

_{"Bury their hearts"}

While Nikolaev and Volodin framed gender transition as something dangerous, newfangled and absurd, transgender healthcare has a long-if understudied-history in Russia. Russian transgender and intersex people have been legally able to change their gender since 1926, with the earliest evidence of gender transition in the USSR dating back to 1929 in Kazan. In 1972, a Latvian surgeon named Viktors Kalnbērzs carried out the first successful phalloplasty for a transgender man. Despite a hushing-up of the procedure and professional censures for Kalnbērzs, other medical professionals continued to study trans healthcare in the USSR. In 1975, a Soviet psychiatrist named Aron Belkin published an article on his observations of 30 people who had undergone sex-change operations and legally changed their genders. In 1983, the medical diagnosis of "transsexualism" came into use in the Soviet Union, and clinical recommendations for treatment appeared in 1991.

In Russia, the process to legally and medically transition was until recently the remit of the Ministry of Health. Those hoping to transition were first required to undergo a process involving a specialized medical commission. The commission involved a series of invasive and expensive steps, including a physical exam and sessions with psychiatrists to prove one's "trans-ness." The commission was only available in major cities, which made it difficult for those in the country's disparate provinces to access. If an applicant was successfully approved by the commission, they were able to legally change the gender marker in their documents and receive gender-affirming medical care, such as hormone replacement therapy or surgery. This possibility for some Russian transgender people to legally and medically transition does not imply that conditions for transgender people were positive until recently. A 2019 survey of transgender Russians found that the majority of respondents faced discrimination leading to psychological distress.[11] Nonetheless, until recently the opportunity to medically and legally transition did exist in Russia-the Kremlin's ire had been focused on gays and lesbians instead.[12]

Following mass protests and accusations of electoral fraud in 2011, Putin sought new means of shoring up his political legitimacy; the result was a new social contract based on traditional values and security.[13] This conservative shift could be characterized by three ideological elements: a struggle to preserve purity, defence against moral decay, and an anti-Western fervour.[14] The Kremlin framed gays and lesbians as a threat to Russia's demographic growth, to the safety of children, and as "trojan horses operating on behalf of Western states."[15] Homosexuals were particularly vulnerable to accusations of "Western-ness," due to the fact that queer life in Russia remained largely out of the public eye until a period of partial sexual liberalization between the late 1980s and the early 2000s.[16] Queerness has thus been framed as a recent Western import, a threat to "sovereignty and stability on one hand, and the protection of children on the other."[17] The foreignness of queer people has been buttressed by the fact that the vast majority of Russians claim that they do not have any homosexual acquaintances.[18]

In 2013, shortly following Putin's turbulent return to office, Russia's State Duma passed the infamous "gay propaganda law" forbidding the "propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations" to minors. The law was eagerly supported by state-run media, the Orthodox Church, conservative politicians, and "pro-family" organizations.[19] The law framed Russia as a bastion of conservativism, the world's "last protector of traditional Christian values," a shield against Western "relativism, pluralism, and liberalism."[20] It had a devastating effect on the Russian queer community: public or semi-public events became illegal, lesbian and gay parents were thrown into legal jeopardy, and hate crimes towards queer people also rose sharply.[21] In 2017, the authorities in the Russian province of Chechnya tortured and killed gays and lesbians with impunity.[22] "Fining gays for the propaganda of homosexuality to minors is not enough," said Kremlin propagandist Dimitry Kiselyov in 2013, "they should be banned from donating blood or sperm. In the case of an automobile accident, their hearts should be buried or burned as unfit for extending anyone's life."

_{The "propaganda of sex change"}

Since 2013, Putin has repeatedly returned to the "defense of traditional values" in times of political turbulence; it is therefore not surprising that attacks on gays and lesbians have been heavily incorporated into the rhetoric surrounding the conflict in Ukraine. Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church stated that Russia invaded Ukraine to liberate Ukrainians from gay pride parades. At the annexation ceremony for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on September 30, 2022, Putin claimed to be protecting children from "perversions that lead to degradation and extinction." State TV Channel One purportedly discovered an American "gay and lesbian headquarters" attacking children in Mariupol. Since the invasion, the Kremlin also enacted a patchwork of legislation designed to crack down on civil liberties in Russia. In a bid to demonize LGBTQ+ people and further suppress freedom of speech, the aforementioned 2013 "gay propaganda" law has been dramatically expanded, essentially outlawing all forms of public queer life in Russia (and some forms of private life as well). Russian lawmakers then turned their attention toward transgender people. At breakneck speed, legislation banning gender transitions passed three readings in the Duma between 13 and 14 July 2023, and was sent to the Federation Council for approval on July 19. The law was then signed by President Putin and came into effect on 24 July, prohibiting transgender people in Russia from changing the gender marker in their documents (with an exception for intersex people). It also banned doctors from providing gender-affirmative healthcare, such as hormone replacement therapy or surgery. The law did not revert the gender of those who had already legally transitioned but denies them the ability to adopt children or become legal guardians for minors.

The legislation is also hugely detrimental from a healthcare perspective. A collective response by representatives of almost 30 human rights organizations, HIV-advocates, medical and legal organizations, and transgender community initiatives stated that the bill "is aimed at discriminating against and depriving access to medical care to people with the medical diagnosis of 'transsexualism,' and is based on information that is not supported by sufficient evidence." Even the Russian Ministry of Health-historically no friend of the LGBTQ+ community-reportedly wrote a letter to Russian Duma members opposing the law. Russian healthcare researchers are concerned that the law could lead to a rise in self-harm, either by increasing the risk of suicide for trans people or bringing back the type of clandestine medical treatment and self-castration seen in Russia in the 1990s and 2000s.

The law may also have a broader impact on societal transphobia. As previously mentioned, the implementation of the "gay propaganda" law saw a rise in violence and hate crimes against gays and lesbians.[23] It may be expected that the new law will also coincide with a rise in hate crimes against trans people. Anecdotal reports of transphobic incidents have already surfaced: in June, transgender Russian blogger Olysia Kat was held by the police for 24 hours, denied legal counsel and repeatedly called a man. A transgender woman in Khimki was misgendered by the police and threatened with incarceration in a male prison. Another trans woman in Moscow was arrested for yelling "glory to Ukraine" in a nightclub, forced to undress in front of the police and tell them her birth name. In Altai Krai, a transgender candidate for governor withdrew her nomination after political support waned in response to the new bill. In Penza, a transgender university student is under pressure to drop out due to their change in documentation. In Krasnodar, a gender nonconforming student was expelled for "propaganda of sex change."

In construing gender transition as "propaganda," Russian conservatives have drawn on "depravity stories" from liberal Western countries, as they have previously done for issues related to homosexuality, gender, and children.[24] These include stories of foreign homosexual couples adopting boys and forcibly raising them as girls and describing sexual education in Western schools as a form of paedophilia and grooming.[25] Putin has favoured these depravity stories on multiple occasions, including in his speech at the annexation ceremony for the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples' Republics:

"They have already moved on to the radical denial of moral, religious, and family values… do we want to have here, in our country, in Russia, "parent number one, parent number two and parent number three"… instead of mother and father? Do we want our schools to impose on our children, from their earliest days in school, perversions that lead to degradation and extinction? Do we want to drum into their heads the ideas that certain other genders exist along with women and men and to offer them gender reassignment surgery? Is that what we want for our country and our children? This is all unacceptable to us. We have a different future of our own."[26]

These depravity stories are not uniquely Russian, in fact, they are repeated ad nauseum by far-right conservative movements in the same Western countries in which these depravity stories supposedly take place. In the case of Russian traditional-values conservativism, they are instead incorporated into a broader morality of anti-Westernism.[27] Fictitious accounts of child abuse and a breakdown of social order in the West thus functions as a cautionary tale of the slippery slope that happens when transgender people and same-sex couples are given civil rights. 

_{A "criminal network"}

Ironically, while the West is framed as having succumbed to "gender ideology," it is grappling with a transphobic movement of its own. In fact, Russian traditional-values conservativism has developed alongside-and in cooperation with-Western transnational conservative movements.

Communism had kept the Russian Orthodox Church "on a tight leash" for most of the twentieth century, meaning that with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Church had no coherent conservative ideology to match its Western counterparts.[28] Issues such as same-sex marriage, homeschooling, or even abortion were not high on the agenda of the Moscow Patriarchate under Communism.[29] Directly following the collapse of the USSR, Western conservative organizations such as the World Congress of Family and the Vatican were instrumental in importing conservative narratives to Russia, framing liberalism as a fate worse than Soviet communism.[30]  The past thirty years has seen a dramatic ideological shift for the Russian Orthodox Church, and a sharp increase in its influence over Kremlin policy.[31] The Moscow Patriarchate underwent what Kristina Stoeckl and Dmitry Uzlaner have termed a "conservative aggiornamento," a transformation to align itself ideologically with global conservative movements.[32] American narratives of "culture war" have gained particular prominence, wherein global conservative forces are engaged in "a bitter contest [with progressives] over the future and destiny of the people."[33] By the end of the 1980s, American culture war rhetoric had become truly transnational, with Christian Right NGOs taking an active role in international institutions such as the United Nations.[34]

Since the 1980s, this "anti-gender" movement has grown to encompass religious bodies, academics, right-wing politicians, "gender-critical" feminists and NGOs that broadly stand against rights relating to gender.[35] Anti-gender actors aim to roll back marriage equality and curtail access to reproductive rights (with notable success in the US). In Russia, the influence of these actors-both international and domestic-has led to traditional family values, abortion, and education becoming central issues in contemporary Russian society.[36] Although it has drawn heavily on the ideology of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Kremlin's "traditional values" agenda has resonated "beyond the cultural and geographical sphere of Russian Orthodoxy."[37] In the Islamic republic of Chechnya, for example, the violent campaign of homophobic violence in 2017 saw the same traditional-values rhetoric layered with "a project of authoritarian Islamic revival," indicating yet another source of ideological influence.[38] The Kremlin has also drawn upon Russian nationalist thought, working in tandem with Russian academic institutions.[39]

Russia has gone on to play an active role in the international anti-gender movement, including participating in ideological exchanges and providing support for populist radical right-wing movements in Europe.[40] The Moscow Patriarchate now presents itself as the Western world's "last protector of traditional Christian values" and has become a powerful ally for the American Christian Right.[41] According to a report by the EU Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights, between 2008 and 2018 Russian oligarchs contributed almost 200 million USD to anti-gender organizations such as the World Congress of Families, CitizenGo and The Center for Family and Human Rights.[42] Russian conservative intellectuals and ultra-nationalists such as Aleksandr Dugin and Konstantin Malofeev have been sources of influence for Catholic anti-gender ideologues and other conservative organizations.[43] 

_{Discourse Coalitions}

In his 2023 article on anti-gender politics, Emil Edenborg outlined the ways in which Russian conservatives have developed shared narratives of "traditional values" across unlikely "discourse coalitions." Edenborg drew on the work of Maarten Hajer, which defined these coalitions as "a group of actors that, in the context of an identifiable set of practices, shares the usage of a particular set of storylines over a particular period of time."[44] Coalition members are united by elements of various discourses into a seemingly coherent whole, which allows for cooperation towards impactful interventions by concealing points of contention or discursive complexity.[45] Edenborg outlines the ways in which discourse coalitions have shaped Russian homophobia on the international stage; at the UN, Russia has taken a leading role in the promotion of "traditional values" in the area of sexual and reproductive rights and LGBTQ issues, forming a voting block with countries "outside its historic sphere of influence…despite the absence of shared understanding."[46] Domestically, coalitions have united disparate ideological factions in Russian society, allowing them to coalesce around shared storylines of "traditional values."[47]

The Kremlin's decision to outlaw medical and legal transition in Russia is a product of these "discourse coalitions" on both national and international levels. In recent years, Western "anti-gender" activists have become increasingly focused on trans rights, pushing a return to "traditional family values" and "natural law." Particularly in America, transphobic legislation has quickly gained momentum, with laws regulating everything from bathroom use to school curriculums and drag performances. Book bans have come into effect, along with bans on gender-affirming care and even the discussion of LGBTQ+ topics in schools. Russian transphobia, like contemporary Russian homophobia before it, has been shaped by international coalitions of traditional-values actors. The West thus plays three roles in the practice of Russian transphobia; firstly, as an aggressor imposing gender ideology on Russian children, secondly as a cautionary tale and the origin of "depravity stories," and lastly, paradoxically, as a site of "discourse coalition" with international conservative organizations and actors. "They have completely lost it!" mused Putin, during a speech on September 30, 2022. His remarks framed Russia as the last remaining bastion of conservative values in the world-yet as the international influences shaping Russian transphobia show, this is not the case.

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